Al-Qaeda - leading transnationalist jihadist organization led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri

Ayman al-Zawahiri - Osama bin Laden's deputy and Al Qaeda's leading theoretician and ideologue

Jihad - armed struggle

Fawaz A. Gerges' The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global is a comprehensive look at the events leading up to the well-known events of September 11th, 2001. Gerges' research includes interviews with former jihadis (militant Islamists), reviews of jihadist actions, documents and manifestos, and the review of 911 Commission documents. He examines the history, actions and ideas of key players, and encourages readers to take an in-depth look at the structure of the jihadist movement. Gerges' commitment to educating us is evident in his provision of three glossaries-one for terms, another about people, and another that includes descriptions of organizations. Finally, Gerges' analysis provides important information about the future of the jihadist movement.

Fawaz Gerges warns that in trying to understand the motives of our September 11th attackers, we must be careful to understand (A) the structure of the jihadist movement; (B) the political and social base of the jihadist movement; and (C) the factions that exist within the jihadist movement-in other words: all Muslims are not the same; all jihadis did not agree to the September 11th attacks.

The structure of the jihadist movement is deep. There are religious nationalists and transnationalists. Nationalist jihadis favor correcting local Muslim "renegades," Muslims whose actions are believed to invite colonialism and exploitation-sell-outs. They favor local attacks-attacks within Upper Egypt, for example. Gerges reports that throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, jihadis devoted most of their resources to dislodging the Near Enemy-local sell-outs. Transnationalist jihadis (such as Al Qaeda) prefer waging battle against lands beyond the borders of places like Upper Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Their strategy is to attack the Far Enemy, perpetrators of democracy and free-will-the United States and her allies.

Understandably, the jihadists did not sit down and take a vote about which strategy would override the other. While tension split the ranks, trigger-happy transnationalists set their confident sights on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

By the 1990s, according to Gerges, "the jihadist caravan had gone global with full speed." Gerges says at another point in his work: "Overnight, the United States, the sole surviving superpower, went to the top of [Osama bin Laden's list of enemies]. More than any other variable, bin Laden frequently used the American military presence in the land of [Mecca and Medina] as a rallying cry and an effective recruitment tool to lure young Muslims to join his anti-American network."

The reasons that jihad went global are many. For example, the withdrawal of Russian troops during the Afghan war gave confidence to Arab veterans who then believed they were fit militarily for local and international conflicts. Gerges also reports that the United States' stationing of troops in Kuwait in1990 inflamed Saudi nativists, including "Osama bin Laden and like-minded radicals, and reinforced their convictions that the U.S. had hegemonic designs on their countries." Regional conflicts in places like the Middle East, the Caucasus, Bosnia, and Kashmir, "supplied a steady stream of Arab and Muslim recruits" for bin Laden, Khattab, and Zawahiri brigades.

Gerges believes that Al Qaeda's decision-making apparatus and recruitment efforts have been severely damaged. However, many people are not impressed with the decision of U.S. policymakers to invade Iraq. Gerges warns that the sympathy felt by many as a result of the September 11th attacks has turned to rage. Many do not agree with the current U.S. militarism and aggression in Iraq. Further, Gerges warns that the American invasion of Iraq has supplied bin Laden and his associates with ammunition to use against the [U.S.] and to tap into an Arab sense of victimhood, marginality, and helplessness. In addition, Gerges posits that "young Muslims unconnected to Al Qaeda but enraged by the U.S. occupation of Iraq can [b]e nudged by militants to target and kill Americans and their European and even Muslim allies." To counterbalance such effects, Gerges suggests that U.S. policymakers cultivate a partnership with Muslim civil society aimed at [reducing] social discontent in the world of Islam, which includes addressing socioeconomic issues. Simultaneously, Gerges suggests that Arab and Muslim officials "take charge of their political destiny by condemning bin Ladenism and engaging in struggles against patriarchy, political tyranny, and militancy."

Jihadis are similar to religious fundamentalists everywhere-they believe it is their duty to correct anyone that does not practice the "right" religion-the religion they practice, and they are usually motivated by years of alienation. In other words, they have egos the size of Texas, and feel the same sense of entitlement that people feel when they insist on living in perpetual victimhood. "Woe is me, so I must kill you!" they cry. (No pun intended.) Their woe is typically the result of poverty, joblessness, despair, and their own perceived piety. The actions of jihadis leading up to the September 11th attacks are an example of how emotional imbalances can have catastrophic results. Poverty and piety are like oil and water. I have often said: "Poverty breeds contempt." Many of bin Laden's (and others') recruits were poverty-stricken, and frustrated by the lack of educational and employment opportunities in their native lands. Others were driven by a sense of righteousness, or both poverty and piety. Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we are more concerned with the spiritual and religious obligations of others, instead of focusing on our own behavior and thought patterns.

Fawaz A. Gerges' The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global is an insightful book, and should be required reading for all students of international relations, social welfare, political science, public policy, and sociology-and anyone who wants to read examples of how costly ignorance is.

Shakesha Coleman holds a Master's degree in public policy, and is an aspiring writer.